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Peterson v. Sorlien
Over the past decade, Americans have witnessed with some alarm the
proliferation of new religious cults. The Hare Krishna, the Moonies, and the
Children of God represent only the tip of a vast mystic iceberg. These groups
are characterized by the devotion of their members to cult doctrine, by group
identity, and by leadership authority. The radical personality changes noted in
new devotees have led to charges that the cults use brainwashing and mind
control techniques to attract and retain members. This conviction has led
many parents to abduct their children from cults in an attempt to liberate the
captive mind via intense confrontation: the process popularly known as de-
programming.
During her freshman year at college, Susan Peterson joined a religious
organization known as The Way. Her parents became concerned over radical
changes in her personality as she became more involved with the group. With
the help of professional deprogrammers, Susan's parents removed her from
the cult and detained her against her will. Although the parents were success-
ful in persuading her to renounce the cult, Susan later rejoined The Way and
brought suit against her parents and the deprogrammers for false imprison-
ment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Peterson v. Sorlien'
the Supreme Court of Minnesota found no tort liability because Susan had
consented to her parents' actions beginning on the fourth day of the depro-
gramming.- A minority opinion objected to the retroactive application of the
consent.
This Case Comment will explore briefly the history and nature of the cult
phenomenon in America, with an emphasis on previous litigation involving
deprogramming attempts. The Peterson opinion will be examined in detail,
and the various bases for tort liability will be explored in the context of a
typical deprogramming case. The majority's use of consent as a defense will
be examined and supported in light of cultic mind control techniques and
common-law capacity doctrines.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Cults in America
The cult phenomenon in America has its roots in the human potential
movement of the 1960s. In that decade Americans became familiar with en-
counter groups, primal therapy, Gestalt, and a host of other consciousness
1. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). For a recent discussion of this case,
see 15 AKRON L. REV. 165 (1981).
2. 299 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Minn. 1980).
3. Id. at 134 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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expanding techniques. 4 In the early 1970s this desire for self-realization began
to channel itself into what appeared to be more traditional religious areas.
Interest in Eastern meditative religions grew, and membership in a variety of
seemingly Christian groups increased. 5 By the mid-1970s America's young
people were joining new religious cults in unprecedented numbers. In 1977
estimates of the number of Americans involved in cults were as high as
750,000.6 With the rise of the cults came the phenomenon of parental attempts
to extricate children from cult influence. In 1977 the American Civil Liberties
Union estimated that deprogramming attempts occurred five to ten times per
week in the United States.7
By early 1978, however, the cults were beginning to lose converts! Cult
membership declined because of government inquiries into cult practices,
unfavorable publicity, and the success of court-sponsored conservatorships
as a means of removing members from the cults. 9 Public dismay over the
November 1978 poisoning of over 900 members of Jim Jones' People's
Temple in Jonestown, Guyana, further damaged the cult's image. 0 Concur-
rent with the decline in cult membership came a decline in deprogrammings.
One 1980 report indicated that deprogramming attempts had "slowed to a
trickle," largely because of unfavorable court rulings."
Recent evidence indicates that the cults are experiencing a renaissance as
they recover from the unfavorable publicity surrounding Jonestown. 2 Cults
are channeling their energies into new areas, including business acquisitions,
while seeking to Avoid any publicity. ' 3 It appears that deprogramming will
remain an issue through this decade. 14
A number of characteristics differentiate modern cults from established
religions. For the purpose of this Case Comment, a cult can be identified by
the presence of the following:
(1) Total allegiance to a powerful, living leader, often thought to be a
messiah, whose pronouncements form the basis for cult doctrine and
practice;
(2) The prohibition of rational thought;
4. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 13-14 (1978).
5. Id. at 14.
6. Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 6 nn.24-25 (1977).
7. Religious Cults: Is the Wild Fling Over?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1978, at 44, 44.
8. Id.
9. Id. For a discussion ofconservatorships as a tool of deprogramming, see infra text accompanying notes
97-107.
10. A Comeback for Religious Cults?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1980, at 73, 73.
11. Id. at 74. For a discussion of various court rulings on deprogramming, see infra text accompanying
notes 63-107.
12. A Comeback for Religious Cults?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1980, at 73, 74.
13. Id.
14. See, for example, Rosner v. Patrick, No. CIV-81-121C (W.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 13, 1981). The complaint,
filed by an adherent of Transcendental Meditation against her parents and deprogrammers, charged a conspiracy
to interfere with her civil rights in violation of the Civil Rights Act. For additional litigation under the Civil
Rights Act, see infra text accompanying notes 73-93.
[Vol. 43:465
TORT LIABILITY FOR CULT DEPROGRAMMING
(3) Deceptive recruiting techniques;
(4) The use of coercive persuasion, mind control, and brainwashing tech-
niques to attract and retain members;"5 and
(5) Isolation from the outside world. ' 6
Many groups meet these criteria, but an elite class of cults dominates the
field. These are the largest and most prominent cults, and the ones most
frequently involved in legal battles. They are the Unification Church, The
Way International, The Divine Light Mission, The International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, and The Children of God.
The Unification Church was founded in Seoul, Korea, in 1954. '7 Its
founder and current leader is Sun Myung Moon, a Korean industrialist. From
Moon derives the popular name for members of the cult: Moonies. Moon sent
his first missionary to the United States in 1959.8 The church begins its
recruiting process at an initial dinner meeting, which is followed by a weekend
seminar retreat. Recruiters do not reveal the identity of the group as a reli-
gious organization with Moon at its head until well into the indoctrination
process.' 9 The Unification Church allegedly uses techniques of mind control
during indoctnnation. Members of the church worship Sun Myung Moon as
the messiah of God, the Lord of the Second Advent.2' In late 1980 the
Unification Church claimed membership of 30,000 in the United States.
22
The Way International, known simply as The Way, was founded by
Victor Paul Wierwille, a former minister in the United Church of Christ. The
cult, still led by Wierwille, has its headquarters in New Knoxville, Ohio.
Wierwille claims to have started the cult in 1942, but it did not experience
significant growth until the late 1960s.2 3 Today The Way claims 100,000 dedi-
cated followers. 24 All the teachings of the church originate from Wierwille's
personal interpretation of the Bible, contained in a series of videotapes, which
cost members eighty-five dollars. 25
The Divine Light Mission is a worldwide organization that derives its
theology principally from Hindu scriptures. Members see their leader, the
Guru Maharaj Ji, as a messiah in the line of Jesus, Buddha, and Mohammed. 27
The Guru founded the American branch of the cult in 1971, when he was
15. See infra text accompanying notes 205-21.
16. This list is adapted from Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 17, 24-25 (1980). A strikingly similar list is given in C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GODS CHILDREN 4
(1977) [hereinafter cited as STONER & PARKE].
17. J. YAMAMOTO, THE PUPPET MASTER 39 (1977).
18. Id. at 40.
19. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 7.
20. For a description of mind control techniques used by the cults, see infra text accompanying notes
205-21.
21. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 37.
22. A Comeback for Religious Cults?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1980, at 73, 73.
23. J. SPARKS, THE MIND BENDERS 189 (1979).
24. A Comeback for Religious Cults?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1980, at 73, 73.
25. J. SPARKS, THE MIND BENDERS 201 (1979).
26. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 39.
27. Id.
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thirteen years old. 28 Extensive meditation allegedly serves as a means of
controlling the minds of cult members. 29 The Divine Light Mission has over
two hundred local branches in the United States, along with a chain of food
stores and filling stations.30 In 1979 the cult claimed over one million devotees
worldwide. 31
The familiar sight of young men sporting bald heads and orange robes,
chanting and dancing on street corners or in airports, makes the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness (the Hare Krishna) the most visible and
bizarre cult. Its current leader, A. C. Bhaktivedanta, Swami Prabhupada,
founded the cult in New York in 1965.32 Members of the cult are notorious for
their aggressive fund raising techniques. The Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, like the Divine Light Mission, emphasizes chanting and meditation in
the Hindu tradition to achieve bliss. 33 Recent estimates put Krishna member-
ship at 10,000 in the United States.34
In the late 1960s a former Baptist minister named David Berg founded
what was to become The Children of God.35 Berg called himself Moses and
claimed to have had divine revelation of an impending natural disaster.
36
When shocking sexual behavior was revealed to be a hallmark of the cult,
37
the New York Attorney General made a public inquiry into the sexual and
other practices of Berg's Children of God. The resulting report severely dam-
aged the cult's reputation 38 and caused Berg and his followers to move the
entire operation to Europe in 1974. 39
These cults have astounded and alarmed Americans for over a decade.
Frequently, parents with a child in one of these cults have seen removal by
force as the only way to break the cult's hold on their child.
B. Deprogramming
Ted Patrick is America's most prolific deprogrammer, and his methods
are typical of the profession. 40 Since his first deprogramming in 1971,'
4
Patrick claims to have abducted over fifteen hundred cult members.42
Numerous court opinions on deprogramming that bear his name attest to his
activity in the field.43
28. Id. at 58.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 205-21.
30. H. COX, TURNING EAST 92 (1977).
31. Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 17, 18 n.10 (1980).
32. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 42.
33. See id. at 43.
34. A Comeback for Religious Cults?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 24, 1980, at 73, 73.
35. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 65.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 50.
38. Id. at 50, 65.
39. Id. at 66.
40. Patrick describes his career as a deprogrammer in T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, LET OUR CHILDREN
Go (1976) [hereinafter cited as PATRICK & DULACK].
41. Id. at 64-66.
42. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 69 (1978).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 63-83.
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A typical Patrick deprogramming begins with the physical abduction of
the cult member." The parents meet the subject unexpectedly as he is leaving
the cult residence and force him into a waiting car, often with the help of
"hired muscle." 45 The cult member is driven to a predetermined site, usually
a motel room or the home of a former cult member who is helping with the
deprogramming. The subject is not free to leave, and frequently physical
restraint is necessary.4s Ideally, the deprogramming takes place in an upper-
floor room in order to prevent escape out a window. 47 Typical precautions
include a bathroom without a window or an inside lock, and the removal of
the mouthpiece from the telephone." Patrick has found that once local au-
thorities are aware of what he and the parents are attempting to do, they
decline to interfere and on occasion even assist in the process. 49
Once the cult member is isolated from the cult, the actual deprogramming
process begins. Patrick describes the process as "just talk.- 50 The depro-
grammer and the parents point out inconsistencies in the cult's beliefs and ask
questions designed to lead the subject to see how he has been deceived.
Patrick, well-versed in the Bible from his Methodist upbringing, often shows
that Bible passages taken in context are contrary to the cult's altered version
of Biblical truth.5 ' The goal of the deprogramming process is.to encourage the
cult member to use his mind again and to think critically about his cult expe-
rience.52
If the deprogramming is successful, the subject will suddenly snap out of
the cult mentality. 53 At this point the person expresses gratitude at being re-
leased from the cult and is ready to begin a long process of rehabilitation. 54
The deprogramming itself often takes less than a full day and seldom lasts
longer than three days.55
Of course, not every deprogramming is typical. For instance, the process
may not involve any abduction, but rather may occur during a holiday visit by
the cult member.5 6 It may be possible to arrange for a voluntary meeting
between the cult member and a deprogrammer.
5 7
Following a deprogramming the former cult member is susceptible to
drifting back into the cult mentality, a phenomenon termed "floating" by the
deprogrammers. 58 During floating, any contact with former associates, such
44. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 65.
45. Id. at 66-67.
46. Id. at 75.
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id. at 78.
49. Id. at 99, 145, 192.
50. Id. at 75.
51. Id. at 78.
52. Id. at 76.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 222-25.
54. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 67.
55. Id. at 76.
56. This was the case in Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
57. STONER & PARKE, supra note 16, at 224.
58. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 211-14.
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as a brief phone conversation, can persuade the person to rejoin the cult.59
Once back in the cult, the member may be persuaded to bring suit against
parents and deprogrammers.
C. Deprogramming and the Courts
Deprogramming attempts have resulted in numerous lawsuits brought by
deprogramming subjects who later rejoined their cults. Cases have been de-
cided under state and federal kidnapping statutes, 60 federal civil rights legisla-
tion,6' and common-law tort theories.62
In U.S. v. Patrick63 Ted Patrick was indicted for kidnapping under the
federal kidnapping statute. 64 Patrick had been employed by the parents of
Kathy Crampton to deprogram her from a religious cult in the State of
Washington. Patrick admitted the abduction, and the case was tried without a
jury on the sole issue of whether a defense of necessity was available, as set
out in the Model Penal Code. 65 The trial judge held that the defense of neces-
sity was available to both the parents and the deprogrammer when the parents
reasonably believed that they were not physically capable of recapturing their
daughter from imminent danger without assistance. 66 Ted Patrick was acquit-
ted, and the decision was upheld on appeal. 67
Similarly, Patrick later was charged with kidnapping, criminal false im-
prisonment, and conspiracy under Colorado law in People v. Patrick. 
6
Patrick had been employed by parents of cult members to remove their daugh-
ters from a religious cult. Patrick drove the escape vehicle following the
abduction and then performed the two-day deprogramming. 69 The trial judge
refused to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity or choice of evils, 70 and
the jury found Patrick guilty of criminal false imprisonment. 7' In affirming the
verdict, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that in order for the choice of
59. Id.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 73-93.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
63. 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1979).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which reads:
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law
defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
66. 532 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 147. The defense of necessity was not at issue on appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that to allow the United States to appeal would put the defendant in double jeopardy in violation of
the fifth amendment. Id. at 146-47.
68. 541 P.2d 320 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id. at 322.
71. Id. at 321. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-303 (1973).
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evils defense to apply, a public or private injury must be imminent, requiring
emergency action.72 The court found that no such showing had been made.
The most successful vehicle for recovery against parents and depro-
grammers has been the federal Civil Rights Act. 73 Recovery has been granted
under section 1983, 74 section 1985,75 and section 198676 of the Act.
Mandelkorn v. Patrick7 arose from an attempt to deprogram a member
of the Children of God. The cult member brought suit under sections 1983 and
1985, alleging deprivation of the right to freedom of speech, religion, associa-
tion, and interstate travel. 78 The district court held that the complaint stated
valid causes of action 79 and that alleged police participation in the abduction
satisfied the color of state law or state action requirement for recovery under
section 1983.80
In another civil rights action, a member of the Unification Church
brought suit under section 1985 in Weiss v. Patrick. 81 The district court found,
as a factual matter, that the subject of the deprogramming attempt had failed
to prove any injury or deprivation 2 and thus denied his recovery. Moreover,
the court said that even if there had been proof of injury, recovery would be
denied because of the lack of a class-based animus. 83
In Baer v. Baer84 a member of the Unification Church was abducted after
her parents had obtained a conservatorship, or temporary custody, order
72. 541 P.2d 320, 322 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702(1) (1973). For another
recent case in which the defense of necessity was rejected, see People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 276, (Ct. App. 1981). For an extensive discussion of prosecution of deprogrammers under criminal
statutes, see LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 599,621-29 (1978).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1979):
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws...
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976):
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in
section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and have power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable
to the party injured ....
77. 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973).
78. Id. at 692. The same constitutional rights were asserted in each of the civil rights cases discussed below.
79. Id. at 697.
80. Id.
81. 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), affd mem., 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id. at 723-24. The class-based animus is a requirement for section 1985 recovery, which was set forth
by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1970): "The language requiring intent to
deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."
84. 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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from a local judge.8 5 Contrary to the decision in Weiss, 86 the district court
found that a class-based animus was present in the deprogramming attempt;
however, recovery under section 1985 was denied because the court found no
constitutional power to reach an essentially private religious controversy.87
The court also denied recovery under section 1983, holding that the conser-
vatorship order did not satisfy the color of state law requirement."s
The district court held in Augenti v. Cappellini89 that all the elements
were present to state valid causes of action under sections 1983, 1985, and
1986 in a deprogramning controversy. 90 The court found state action by
virtue of the presence of a uniformed police officer at the deprogramming
session and cited Baer9' as support for a finding of a class-based animus. 9-
Numerous deprogramming opinions since Augenti have found the re-
quired state action and class-based animus necessary for recovery under the
Civil Rights Act. 93 Clearly, the Civil Rights Act is a viable means of recovery
for a deprogramming victim if he can establish some minimal state involvement.
Until Peterson v. Sorlien 94 no court had addressed the issue of tort liabil-
ity for an attempted deprogramming. The complaints in Mandelkorn, Weiss,
Baer, and Augenti95 alleged the torts of false imprisonment, assault, and
battery, but the issue of tort liability was not examined in the written opin-
ions. The later portions of this Case Comment will address the potential for
tort actions against deprogrammers and parents. 96
Largely because of the fear of being prosecuted or sued, parents and
deprogrammers have sought legal means to accomplish deprogramming.
These attempts frequently have taken the form of court-ordered conservator-
ships under state statutes empowering such orders. 97 Prosecutors from the
85. Id. at 485. For a discussion of conservatorships, see infra text accompanying notes 97-107.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
87. 450 F. Supp. 481,489-96 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The court denied recovery under section 1986 as well, since
recovery there depends on a violation of section 1985. Id. at 496.
88. Id. at 485-89.
89. 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
90. Id. at 76-78.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
92. 84 F.R.D. 73, 77-78 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
93. Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981) (congressional power to reach due to interstate travel),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1253 (1982); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (judge's nonjudicial
agreement with defendants establishes color of state law; congressional power to reach due to interstate travel),
rev'g 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); Helander v. Patrick, No. 77 Civ. 2401
(S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1981) (allegation of an arrangement with state officials is sufficient state action for section
1983 recovery); Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (that police knew ofabduction but failed to
take action held to establish state action).
94. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 77-92. See also Taylor v. Gilmartin, 434 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Okla.
1977) (plaintiff monk alleged assault, battery, and false imprisonment in connection with attempts to deprogram
him from monastery experience).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 150-261.
97. E.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-401 (1969):
Upon petition and after notice and hearing in accordance with the provisions of this Part, the Court
may appoint a conservator or make other protective order for cause as follows: ... (2) Appointment
of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to the estate and affairs of a person if
the court determines that (i) the person is unable to manage his property and affairs effectively for
reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability ....
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District Attorney's office in Tucson, Arizona, have helped many parents
obtain this assistance. The process begins with a writ of habeas corpus order-
ing the cult to produce the member for a court hearing on mental incompe-
tence. 98 Notice often is served on the cult during predawn hours, a surprise
designed to prevent the cult from removing the member from the jurisdic-
tion.99 After evidence of the member's radical personality change is presented
at the hearing, the judge usually grants a fifteen- to thirty-day conservatorship
to the parents, during which period the former cult member is questioned by a
hired deprogrammer working under the supervision of a court psychologist. 00
After the conservatorship ends the person is free to return to the cult, but only
one of twenty chooses to do so.' 0
A number of judicial opinions have resulted from deprogrammings that
originated in conservatorship orders. The deprogramming that was the sub-
ject in Baer v. Baer'02 was accomplished by means of a conservatorship. 03 In
Rankin v. Howard,' 0 a civil rights action against parents and deprogrammers,
the cult member's father had obtained a conservatorship order from a probate
judge authorizing the father to take the cult member into custody for counsel-
ing, examination, and treatment.'05 Other conservatorship orders have spec-
ified that counseling and treatment may be performed by doctors, psychi-
atrists, psychologists, social workers, or lay persons, '6 thus presumably al-
lowing participation by professional deprogrammers. In examining the legal-
ity of these procedures, a California Court of Appeals held that California's
conservatorship statute was too vague to justify an order granted to facilitate
deprogramming. 1
07
The law regarding deprogramming is unsettled. Criminal actions against
deprogrammers turn on the defense of necessity,'08 and civil rights actions
have enjoyed a measure of success. '09 Plaintiffs have used the tort action as an
alternate theory of recovery. "10
The issue of tort liability for deprogramming is addressed in Peterson v.
Sorlien. "'
98. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 14, 1976, at 52, 53-54.
99. Id. at 54.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See supra text accompanying notes 84--88.
103. 450 F. Supp. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
104. 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978), rev'd, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
See supra note 93.
105. 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978).
106. In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Rudie, 290 Or. 471, 473, 622 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1981).
107. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Ct. App. 1977). For a discussion of
conservatorships in general and the Katz case in particular, see LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Reli-
gious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 630-35 (1978).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 73-93.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
!II. 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING OF Peterson v. Sorlien
Susan Jungclaus grew up on her family's farm near Bird Island, Minneso-
ta. While in high school she was active in Our Savior's Lutheran Church of
Bird Island, singing in the youth choir and teaching a Sunday School class ."
2
Susan graduated salutatorian of her high school class in 1973. The following
autumn she began studies at Moorhead State College, where she was on the
dean's list her freshman year.3
During her first year at college Susan joined the local chapter of The Way
International. 114 She quickly became involved in the solicitation of new mem-
bers and assisted with Way training sessions. She gave part of her income
earned as a waitress to The Way. " 5 Susan began to receive poor grades and
left some courses incomplete, with the result that her academic performance
barely met the standards for passing. "
6
Susan's parents became alarmed with the changes in their daughter. They
watched as she became increasingly pale, tired, distraught, and irritable ."
7
The frequency of Susan's contacts with the family decreased, and she became
critical of her family's church and its teachings. Her mother was disturbed by
the unsanitary conditions at a Way camp where Susan spent one summer. "s
During Susan's junior year in college her parents began to consider depro-
gramming, a possibility that they discussed with their minister, Paul
Sorlien." 9 They decided to remove Susan from The Way.
On May 24, 1976, Susan was picked up following her third-quarter col-
lege examinations by her father, Norman Jungclaus, and her former pastor,
Paul Sorlien. She was twenty-one years old at the time. Susan thought that the
trip would be to the family home in Bird Island for a vacation; instead the
three drove to a private home in Minneapolis to begin the deprogramming
process. 20 All participants in the deprogramming became defendants in the
subsequent lawsuit. Kathy Mills was the professional deprogrammer in the
group and had participated in at least forty previous deprogrammings.'
2 1
Veronica Morgel, whose son had been a member of a religious cult, provided
the use of her home. Michele Perkins, a former member of The Way, also
assisted in the deprogramming.12 Susan's parents, Norman and Margaret
Jungclaus, were present throughout, and Paul Sorlien, the Jungclaus' pastor,
participated marginally.'2
112. Brief for Respondents at 3.
113. 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Brief for Respondents at 4.
117. 299 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1980).
118. Brief for Respondents at 4.
119. 299 N.W.2d 123, 131 (Minn. 1980).
120. Id. at 127.
121. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at 6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. 299 N.W.2d 123, 131 (Minn. 1980).
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Once Susan was inside the Morgel residence, a dresser was moved to
block one door, and Veronica Morgel blocked another door to prevent es-
cape.' 24 Susan's father and the others restrained her in the Morgel basement
for several days.'25 She never was left alone during that initial period, and she
repeatedly asked to be released. 1
26
By the third day of her confinement, however, Susan's demeanor had
changed completely.' 27 She conversed normally with her father, went roller
skating, played softball, and vacationed in Columbus, Ohio, with another
former cult member. Susan even expressed a desire to extricate her fianc6,
Kevin Peterson, from The Way. 
28
After the initial three-day period of protest, Susan had several opportuni-
ties to escape: she was often in public places virtually unguarded, uniformed
police were present at the airports she visited, and in Columbus she was
interviewed by a concerned F.B.I. agent. This period of acquiescence lasted
thirteen days, from May 27, 1976, through June 9, 1976.129 While in Columbus
Susan spoke daily with her fianc6, who played The Way tapes and songs over
the phone and begged her to come back to the cult. Upon returning to Min-
neapolis from Columbus on June 9, Susan contacted the police and soon
rejoined The Way. 130 She later brought suit against those involved in the
deprogramming attempt, charging false imprisonment and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 131
The trial began on November 14, 1977, and lasted three weeks.' 32 The
case was tried before a jury of five women and one man, with Judge Bruce C.
Stone, Hennepin County District Court, presiding. 133 Each of the defendants
pleaded consent as a defense, 34 and defendant Sorlien also asserted necessity
as a privilege defense. This necessity defense was rejected by the judge, who
charged the jury accordingly. 135
The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant Sorlien on the
basis that his minimal participation in the deprogramming made him not liable
as a matter of law. 136 The other defendants were exonerated by jury verdict of
the charges of false imprisonment; 137 however, Veronica Morgel and Kathy
124. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at 9.
125. 299 N.W.2d 123, 133 (Minn. 1980).
126. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at 11-12.
127. 299 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1980).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. at 127.
131. Id. at 125.
132. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at 2.
133. Brief for Respondents at 9.
134. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at A-50 to A-61.
135. Id. at A-36:
Such a defense becomes applicable in a false imprisonment action only if and when the person detained
is in imminent danger of immediate physical or mental injury. The privilege of detention then exists
only for a limited period of time, until legal or medical authorities can be summoned. I charge you that
as a matter of law, the defense of privilege or of necessity is not applicable ....
136. 299 N.W.2d 123, 131 (Minn. 1980).
137. Id. at 126.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Mills were found liable by the jury for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 3 8 After the judge denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the claim of false imprisonment, 39 plaintiff appealed
to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
The main issue considered in Chief Justice Sheran's majority opinion was
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant ajudgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the false imprisonment claim. In affirming the trial court, Sheran
discussed at length the methods of mind control and coercive persuasion used
by various cults. 40 Sheran's opinion indicates that the jury verdict must have
been based on a finding of consent by the plaintiff, and the opinion finds
ample basis in fact for such a finding. ' 4' Sheran recognized a problem with
regard to the first three days of the deprogramming; during this time it was
obvious that the plaintiff did not consent. But in his opinion Sheran reasoned
that since the cult conditioning process may have impaired Susan's volitional
capacity to consent, her consent on the third day could be applied retroactive-
ly to cover the entire confinement: "Following her readjustment, the ev-
idence suggests that Susan was a different person, 'like her old self.' As such,
the question of Susan's consent becomes a function of time. We therefore
deem Susan's subsequent affirmation of defendants' actions dispositive."' 
42
The court also addressed a number of peripheral issues on appeal. It held
that evidence of The .Way's practices and activities was admissible since it
was necessary in evaluating each defendant's state of mind for the purpose of
assessing punitive damages. 143 The supreme court held that the trial court may
have erred in allowing the jury to consider that The Way was financing the
lawsuit, but found that the error, if any, was not significant enough to merit
reversal.'44 The court upheld the directed verdict in favor of defendant
Sorlien. 45 Finally, the supreme court ruled that the trial court did not err in
refusing to allow the plaintiff to add a civil rights'46 cause of action almost a
year after the suit had been commenced. '47
The dissent believed that the majority mishandled the consent issue.'"4
Specifically, the dissent found no reason to allow the consent to relate back to
the initial confinement and felt that the retroactive consent would set a
"dangerous precedent." 49
The Peterson case suggests an examination of tort recovery in depro-
gramming cases. The remainder of this Case Comment will review the el-
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 205-21.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
142. 299 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1980).
143. Id. at 129-30.
144. Id. at 130-31.
145. Id. at 131-32.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 73-93.
147. 299 N.W.2d 123, 132 (Minn. 1980).
148. Id. at 134 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
149. Id.
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ements of several torts in the context of a typical deprogramming attempt and
will then consider the proper role of consent in deprogramming cases.
III. TORT ELEMENTS IN A TYPICAL DEPROGRAMMING CASE
A. Battery
The elements of the tort of battery are (1) a volitional act, 50 (2) an intent
to cause harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension of such
contact,' 5 ' and (3) a resulting harmful or offensive contact. 5 2 These elements
may be present in several phases of a typical deprogramming attempt.
The most obvious battery may occur during the initial abduction. Con-
sider the following account of one such abduction by deprogrammer Ted
Patrick:
Wes [the cult member to be deprogrammed] had taken up a position facing the car,
with his hands on the roof and his legs spread-eagled. There was no way to get him
inside while he was braced like that. I had to make a quick decision. I reached
down between Wes's legs, grabbed him by the crotch and squeezed-hard. He let
out a howl, and doubled up, grabbing for his groin with both hands. Then I hit,
shoving him headfirst into the back seat of the car and piling in on top of him. "'
Of course, not all abductions are this violent, but frequently a physical shov-
ing of the cult member into the escape vehicle does occur. '5 Both parents and
deprogrammers have been involved with the use of force at this point. ' The
elements of a battery are clearly present here. The shoving, grabbing, and
forcing into the car are volitional acts. While the parents and deprogrammers
may not desire that the subject be harmed or offended, they clearly have
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the resulting contact will be harmful
or offensive. Thus, the intent requirement is satisfied. 56 Finally, contact
usually results from the intended act and is offensive or harmful or both, as
with the groin injury described above.
The abduction in Peterson v. Sorlien 7 was not accomplished by force.
Rather, the plaintiff entered the car willingly because of a mistake about the
ultimate destination.'58 Thus, the elements of battery were not present at this
point in the Peterson deprogramming and, not surprisingly, battery was not
alleged. "9
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 2, 13 (1965).
151. Id. at §§ 8A, 13.
152. Id. at §§ 13, 18. The absence of any defense may be considered to be an additional element. See id. at §
5. For a discussion of consent as a defense, see infra text accompanying notes 190-261. The defense of parental
privilege or immunity seldom applies since the cult members in most cases are beyond the age of majority.
153. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 96.
154. See, e.g., id. at 66-67, 138.
155. Id. at 164-66.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
157. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
158. Id. at 127.
159. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at A-I, A-3.
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Battery might occur during a deprogramming when the subject is detained
at the site of the process. For example, the deprogrammer frequently uses
force to keep the cult member from escaping, as this account by Ted Patrick
illustrates: "Wes grabbed for the door, trying to jerk it open. But I got my
arms around him and put him out of commission in a matter of seconds." 160
Similarly, testimony in the Peterson case indicated that both parents and
deprogrammers used physical force to restrain the plaintiff.16l Again, the
elements of battery are present since the contact involved, which is offensive
and may be harmful, clearly is intended to be just that.
Battery may arise at other points during a deprogramining. Ted Patrick
reports having relatives restrain a Hare Krishna devotee while Patrick used
scissors to cut the ceremonial ponytail off his otherwise bald head.' 62 Such
contact is more offensive than harmful, since the ponytail is an important
symbol of the Krishna belief.' 63 Parents, as well, may be involved in violence:
"Wes had been screaming that his mother was evil, was of Satan, all sorts of
filthy and outrageous things, and the father lost his patience finally and
smacked him." 164 These incidents demonstrate that often the elements of
battery are present in a typical deprogramming attempt.
B. Assault
The elements of the tort of assault are (1) a volitional act, (2) an intent to
cause harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension of such
contact, and (3) a resulting imminent apprehension. 65 Another example
drawn from the experience of deprogrammer Ted Patrick illustrates that these
elements are present. Patrick reports the response of Ed Painter, an assistant
in a deprogramming, to an attempted escape by a cult member: "At this, Ed
Painter got furious and cocked his arm as if to lay Ed [the cult member] out
cold. I managed to push him out of the way just in time."66 After averting the
violence, Patrick himself took control. While holding the cult member against
the wall, Patrick said, "You listen to me! You so much as wiggle your toes
again, I'm gonna put my fist down your throat!" '67 The elements of an assault
are present in each of the two episodes. In each there is a volitional act. While
words alone do not satisfy the act requirement, words together with acts are
sufficient.'68 Here, cocking the arm and holding the subject against the wall,
together with the threat of a fist down his throat in the second case, constitute
sUch acts. In the first example Painter intended to cause a harmful contact,
160. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 103.
161. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at 10.
162. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 188.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 105.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
166. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 188.
167. Id. at 189.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1965).
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and the contact was averted only by outside interference. In the second
incident Patrick intended to create apprehension to discourage future escape
attempts. Thus, in each case the intent requirement is met. It should be noted
that Ed's option to escape the contact in the second case, by obedience to
Patrick's command not to move, does not relieve Patrick of potential liability
for assault.' 69 Finally, the element of resulting apprehension is present, since
Patrick reported that Ed's eyes "got bigger and bigger with fear." 170 A poten-
tial for an assault action against deprogrammers exists in such cases. '7'
C. False Imprisonment
The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are (1) a volitional act, (2)
an intent to confine, (3) a resulting confinement, and (4) an awareness of the
confinement by the prisoner, or harm from the confinement.172 False impris-
onment is probably the key tort in a deprogramming case since the essence of
the typical deprogramming is confinement of the subject against his will
throughout the process. An examination of the elements will show that they
usually are present in deprogramming attempts.
The requirement of an act of confinement is very broad for false im-
prisonment. Not only an affirmative act of confinement, but also a failure to
aid in release, satisfies this element.' 73 Additionally, the act need not be one of
force, but may be merely words or acts that induce a reasonable apprehension
that force will be used if the subject does not submit. 74 Measures such as
nailing windows shut at the site of the deprogramming '75 satisfy this element.
In Peterson v. Sorlien 176 the confinement was caused by physical force, 77
threats of physical force, 78 and the creation of actual physical barriers. 79 It
appears that it would be a rare deprogramming that did not include some act
of confinement.
Confinement is clearly intended by the parents and deprogrammers. The
essence of deprogramming is forced separation of the member from the cult.
Deprogrammer Ted Patrick admits, "Yes, in some cases that means restraint.
Yes, it also means the victim may not be free to leave when he wants to.
When a victim is exceptionally vigorous, it may even mean a measure of
169. Id. at § 30.
170. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 189.
171. Consent as a defense to assault and other torts will be considered infra in the text accompanying notes
190-260.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965). See Durgin v. Cohen, 168 Minn. 77,209 N.W. 532
(1926); Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). For a discussion
of consent as a defense to false imprisonment, see infra text accompanying notes 193-94.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 45 (1965).
174. Durgin v. Cohen, 168 Minn. 77, 79, 209 N.W. 532, 533 (1926). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 40-40A (1965).
175. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 15.
176. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
177. Id. at 133.
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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physical restraint."180 Deprogrammers intend to cause confinement since
without it they cannot do their job.
The intended acts almost always cause a resulting confinement, the third
element of the tort of false imprisonment. Parents and deprogrammers seek to
eliminate all possible avenues of escape and they usually succeed. The harsh
consequences of attempted escapes from deprogrammings bear witness to the
reality of confinement. 181
Finally, the cult member almost always is aware of the confinement. In
fact, deprogrammers take pains to point out to the subject that a confinement
is taking place. Ted Patrick described his approach with an uncooperative
member of the Unification Church: "'You're not going to talk. That's okay.
You want to smile at me. Well, I'll smile right back at you. We'll smile
together. I've got nothing else to do. I can stay here three, four months. Even
longer. Nobody's going anywhere."' 182
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause distress, and (3)
resulting severe emotional distress. 83 In Peterson v. Sorlien' the judge in-
structed the jury that the law allows recovery only when the act was inten-
tional or reckless and constituted extreme and outrageous conduct that caus-
ed severe fright or emotional distress. 185 These elements may not be present in
a deprogramming attempt. Unless an enforced confinement for the purposes
of religious discourse is per se outrageous, it is possible for a deprogramming
attempt to occur without ever giving rise to this tort. Usually, the jury decides
whether the conduct rises to the required level of outrage. 86
Two incidents from the experiences of deprogrammer Ted Patrick ex-
emplify conduct that might create a cause of action for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The first involves a conversation between Patrick
and a member of the Unification Church:
As he [Patrick] talks, he works with a felt-tip pen on a photograph of [Church
leader] Sun Myung Moon that he has taken from his briefcase. He draws a pair of
180. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 75.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
182. PATRICK & DUILACK, supra note 40, at 24. The authors go on to point out that seldom does a
deprogramming last as long as five days. Id.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Reckless conduct may satisfy the intent require-
ment. Id. For a discussion of consent as a defense to this tort, see infra text accompanying notes 195-97.
184. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
185. Brief for Appellant and Appendix at A-37.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment h (1965). For examples of conduct that has been
found to be "extreme and outrageous," see Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant wrote a
letter characterizing the plaintiff as a "cheap liar, who would like to be vicious in his falsehoods, but cannot
attain to such degree because of his own cowardice"); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288,
131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1976) (landlord repeatedly used abusive language and threatened tenant's life);
Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 279 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (bill collector in numerous phone conversa-
tions called plaintiff "scum" and a "dead beat").
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horns on Moon's head, then a moustache, pointed ears, making a caricature of the
Devil out of the image the boy has been conditioned to love and re-
vere .... He holds up the vandalized picture .... "There's your god. There's the
son of a bitch. Recognize him? That's who you worship. Satan the snake." 187
Patrick reports a similar incident involving a member of the Hare Krishna
cult: "He [the cult member] sat down abruptly. I had a picture of [cult leader]
Prabhupada and I tore it up in front of him and said, 'There's the no good son
of a bitch you worship. And you call him God!' The usual line of ap-
proach." 188
The above conduct probably would satisfy the elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defacing the image of someone's
revered leader or deity, together with profane name-calling, would likely be
considered extreme and outrageous. The intent of the actor is to create emo-
tional distress, since deprogrammers hope that this distress will jar the subject
into a critical analysis of his experience. "9 Finally, it is entirely reasonable to
expect that such conduct would cause severe emotional distress to the cult
member, who has been instilled with an almost fanatical devotion to the cult
leader involved. Thus, the intentional infliction of emotional distress is at
least a potential theory of recovery in a deprogramining attempt, depending
perhaps on the specific methods used by the deprogrammer.
These four torts appear to be present in some degree in many depro-
gramming attempts. The next section of this Case Comment will explore the
use of consent as a defense in deprogramming cases.
IV. THE DEFENSE OF CONSENT IN DEPROGRAMMING CASES
A. The General Operation of Consent in Tort Cases
Consent, the actual or apparent willingness for conduct to occur, is a
potential defense to all intentional torts, including those torts discussed
above." In a sense, consent is more than just a defense since it negates the
existence of any tort in the first place.' 9' A brief survey of the law will affirm
that consent operates as a defense to each of the four torts that may occur in a
deprogramming case.
Consent is a defense to battery and assault. For instance, in a case
alleging both assault and battery against a physician, the court observed that
in the doctor-patient relationship, as in other situations involving an invasion
of another's person, consent to the act by the person affected negates the
contact as an actionable tort.'92
187. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 24.
188. Id. at 189.
189. Id. at 76.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 892, 892A (1965).
191. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
192. Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477,482, 138 S.E.2d 902, 906 (Ct. App. 1964); accord Belger v. Arnot,
344 Mass. 679, 686, 183 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1962).
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Similarly, consent operates as a defense to an allegation of false impris-
onment. The Supreme Court of Oregon expressly includes consent as a part of
its test in false imprisonment cases. 93 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
applies a rule that in any action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of his liberty
by another without his consent. 194
Consent also operates as a defense to an allegation of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 195 In Carter v. Cangello 96 the consent of the pa-
tient insulated a surgeon from liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress arising out of medical treatment.'97
Consent can take two forms. The first is consent in fact, or actual "will-
ingness ... for conduct to occur." '9 The second, apparent consent, arises
from words or actions reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent. 99 Even when a person does not in fact agree to the conduct of
another, his words or acts or even his inaction may manifest a consent that
will justify the other in relying upon them.200 The classic example of apparent
consent is found in O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co. 201 In O'Brien an im-
migrant steamship passenger presented her arm to a doctor for vaccination
and later sued for assault. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that since the plaintiff's behavior indicated consent the doctor was justified in
his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been. 2 Apparent con-
sent also operates as a defense in false imprisonment actions. In Coates v.
Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, Inc. 23 a Louisiana appellate
court held that the plaintiff's nonresistance to confinement was an apparent
consent, which relieved defendant of liability.
2 4
Consent, therefore, is a powerful potential defense to all intentional torts.
The following sections of this Case Comment will explore the significance of
consent in deprogramming cases.
B. Mind Control and the Cults
The majority opinion in Peterson v. Sorlien concluded that many reli-
gious cults use mind control to attract and retain members. 205 Mental health
193. Roberts v. Coleman, 228 Or. 286, 293, 365 P.2d 79, 82 (1961).
194. Fine v. Kolodny, 263 Md. 647,651,284 A.2d 409,411(1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972); accord
White v. Levy Bros., 306 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Ky. 1957); Banks v. Town, 98 So. 2d 719,722 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 49 (1965).
196. 105 Cal. App. 3d 348, 164 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1980).
197. Id. at 349-51, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 comment b (1965).
199. Id. at § 892(2).
200. Id. at § 892 comment c; accord W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed.
1971).
201. 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891).
202. Id. at 273, 28 N.E. at 266; accord Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 310, 16 A.2d 15, 17 (1940).
203. 152 So. 2d 865 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
204. Id. at 866.
205. 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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professionals agree that cults use mind control upon their converts. Margaret
Thaler Singer, a professor and psychologist at the University of California,
interviewed more than three hundred cult members and former cult members
as part of a comprehensive study of this topic. She concluded that the cults
use highly sophisticated techniques to induce behavioral change. 206 Among
these techniques are long periods of prayer, chanting, meditation (in some
cases, up to twenty-one hours a day), lengthy and repetitive doctrinal lec-
tures, exclusion of family and other outside contacts, and restriction of sexual
contacts. 20 7 Singer also identified the results that these techniques produce in
cult members and ex-cult members: depression, incapacity to make decisions,
loneliness, altered or trancelike states, blurred mental activity, uncritical pas-
sivity, and guilt. 2°s
Other mental health professionals have developed a theory that regards
cult mind control as a type of information disease. 2 9 According to this theory,
cults use chanting and meditation to prevent the cult member from thinking.
This prolonged cessation of thought results in the impairment or suspension of
the ability to think and thus produces disorientation, detachment, withdrawal,
and delusion. 210 "When that happens, not thinking becomes the norm, and
with it there is a reduction in both feeling and awareness. Moreover, once a
person's brain enters this state, the individual may be incapable of coming out
of it." 21
Legal commentators recognize that the cults use mind control tech-
niques and have identified additional elements of the cult indoctrination pro-
cess: intense peer pressure, manipulation of diet, sleep deprivation, lack of
privacy and of time for reflection, and use of ritual to heighten the mystical
experience. 2 2 One commentator concluded that these practices result in a
complete personality transformation in the cult member.2 3 Professor Richard
Delgado of the U.C.L.A. Law School believes that these mind control tech-
niques produce a state of heightened suggestibility in which the cult member
is compelled to reorganize his thoughts and his life along cult lines. 24 Delgado
concludes that the cult member literally loses the ability to think. 25
In Katz v. Superior Court2t 6 a California appellate court-heard testimony
that the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon sought to achieve mind
206. Singer, Coming Out of the Cults, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1979, at 72, 72.
207. Id. at 75.
208. Id. at 75-79.
209. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 170 (1978).
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Conway & Siegelman, Information Disease, SCIENCE DIG., Jan. 1982, at 88.
212. Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 17, 19 (1980).
213. Id. at 20.
214. Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. I, 13 (1977).
215. Id. at 21-22. The methods used by cults to control the minds of their members are strikingly similar to
the brainwashing techniques employed by the Communist Chinese on American prisoners during the Korean
War. See E. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION 123-27 (1%1).
216. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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control through sleep deprivation, isolation, fear, inadequate diet, and intense
guilt. 217 The father of one cult member testified that the personality of his
daughter had become "child-like." 2 8 A psychiatrist who had examined the
cult members testified to their mental narrowness, memory impairment,
blunted emotions, child-like mentality, short attention spans, and paranoia.2 9
In People v. Murphy, 220 a case involving a charge of criminal unlawful
imprisonment against the Hare Krishna cult, a New York superior court
recognized the effects of cult brainwashing:
The fact that indoctrination and constant chanting may be used as a defense
mechanism to ward off what another person is saying or doing is devastating and it
is equally devastating when used as a technique for brainwashing or mind control.
It may even destroy healthy brain cells. It may also cause an inability to think, to
be reasonable or logical. 22'
The authorities cited thus far provide strong evidence that cults use tech-
niques of mind control on their members and that these techniques produce an
altered personality characterized by an inability to think rationally.
Mental health professionals also have concluded that there is often a
moment when the cult's hold on the individual is broken and the person
regains his former identity. 2z2 This event, which has been termed "snapping,"
frequently occurs during a deprogramming session. The cult member's ap-
pearance undergoes a noticeable change, and he comes out of his trancelike
state with the ability to think for himself.2 2 3 According to deprogrammer Ted
Patrick, "The moment when that happens is always unmistakable. It's like
an emotional dam bursting.- 224 Patrick reports one episode in which the
moment of snapping was especially vivid:
Then we went back to our Biblical debate. Gradually she began to listen and
respond. She'd challenge and I'd explain-until I saw that she was actually be-
ginning to use her mind again. It was exciting to watch.
After two days of talking, with three of us taking turns, she suddenly gave in.
She snapped, just as if someone had turned on a light inside her. The change in her
appearance, her expression, her eyes-it was startling. I was amazed. It was like
225seeing someone return from the grave.
The cult member's regaining of a previously impaired mental capacity
during deprogramming is crucial to the operation of consent. The next section
of this Case Comment will review the doctrine of capacity to consent at
common law.
217. Id. at 972, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
218. Id. at 973, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
219. Id. at 976-77, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 248. Testimony by another mental health professional contradicted this
conclusion. Id. at 980, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
220. 98 Misc. 2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
221. Id. at 243, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 545. The court dismissed the indictments, saying that even given the
presence of mind control, this was not a crime under New York law. Id.
222. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 68 (1978).
223. Id.
224. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 79.
225. Id. at 67.
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C. Capacity to Consent at Common Law
The common law has long recognized that capacity to consent is required
in order for consent to operate. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
"To be effective, the consent must be given by one who has the capacity to
give it. ,,6 The Restatement also recognizes that mental deficiency may
be one factor affecting capacity to consent." Dean Prosser indicates that
infancy, intoxication, or mental incompetence may render one incapable of
giving effective consent. 22s These principles were recognized in Koch v.
Stone, 229 in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an eight-year-old
child did not have the capacity to consent to a battery.23
Two significant cases deal with the effect of mental incompetence on
capacity to consent. In Hollerud v. Malamis23 the plaintiff had consumed
sixteen bottles of beer before engaging in an arm wrestling match with the
defendant bartender. As a result of the contest, plaintiff sustained injured
fingers on his left hand and sued the bartender for the torts of assault and
battery. The bartender asserted the plaintiff's consent to the wrestling match
as a defense. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint based on
this defense, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that if the plaintiff was
incapable of expressing a rational will due to intoxication, the consent was
ineffective. 232 The court said that the plaintiff should have been allowed to
prove the effect of the intoxication on his mental facilities and that the trier of
fact should have been allowed to determine whether he was capable of con-
senting to the contest. The court concluded that whether the plaintiff was in
such an advanced state of intoxication that he was incapable of consenting to
the alleged battery presented a genuine issue of material fact. 33
In Grannum v. Berard24 the plaintiff entered the hospital with chest
pains, which were diagnosed later as minor muscle strain. While under the
influence of sedatives and narcotics for this condition, the plaintiff consented
to minor nasal surgery. Following release, the plaintiff sued the surgeon for
battery, arguing that the influence of the drugs had rendered him incapable of
consent. The Supreme Court of Washington held that mental capacity to
consent is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of each
case. 235 Although the court concluded that the plaintiff in this case was not so
incapacitated by the drugs that he was incapable of giving consent, it indicat-
ed that under some circumstances emotional distress may render one incap-
able of consent.
236
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A comment b (1965).
227. Id.
228. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
229. 332 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1960).
230. Id. at 531-32.
231. 20 Mich. App. 748, 174 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1969).
232. Id. at 763, 174 N.W.2d at 634.
233. Id. at 764, 174 N.W.2d at 635.
234. 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
235. Id. at 307, 422 P.2d at 814.
236. Id. at 308-09, 422 P.2d at 815.
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Thus, irrationality and mental distress can affect the capacity to consent,
and the degree to which this has occurred is a question for the trier of fact.
D. A Model for the Operation of Consent in Deprogramming Cases
The key issue in Peterson v. Sorlien, 217 and a crucial issue in most tort
based deprogramming cases, is whether consent given at any time in a depro-
gramming confinement can be applied retroactively to relieve the defendant of
liability for the entire episode. In support of relating back, the majority cites
several cases.238 None of these, however, really raised the relating back issue,
as the dissent points out. 239 The dissent, in turn, 240 cites People v. White24' for
the proposition that later consent does not relate back to prior acts. However,
White is not applicable since it dealt with criminal kidnapping rather than a
civil tort and was based on the public policy that a crime is not only an offense
against a particular individual but against society as a whole. 242 No valid
precedent indicates whether consent can relate back in a civil tort action.
Therefore, it is appropriate in a deprogramming case to examine the realities
of the given situation in light of the capacity doctrines discussed earlier243 and
the mind control techniques used by the cults.244
In a typical deprogramming case the consent doctrines can sensibly be
applied. The hypothetical process begins with an abduction of the cult mem-
ber by physical force. This act gives rise to potential actions for assault and
battery.245 A deprogramming session follows, with the elements necessary for
false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress most likely
present.246 At some point the individual snaps; 247 that is, he breaks free of cult
influence and regains the ability to think for himself.
The moment of snapping is often the point at which consent is manifest-
ed, or at least the point at which conduct begins to indicate consent. Ted
Patrick reports having the following conversation with a former cult member
immediately following an emotional snapping experience:
"Ted, I feel so terrible about all the things I said to you, all the names I called
yOU."
237. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
238. Id. at 128. The cases cited are Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Weiss v. Patrick, 453
F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), affdmem., 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); and Faniel v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147 (D.C. 1979). For additional information on the Weiss case, see
supra text accompanying notes 81-83. For an analysis of why the Faniel opinion fails to support relating back,
see 15 AKRON L. REV. 165, 166-67 (1981).
239. 299 N.W.2d 123, 134 (Minn. 1980) (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
240. Id. at 134 n.l.
241. 53 Mich. App. 51, 218 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1974).
242. Id. at 56, 218 N.W.2d at 405. See 15 AKRON L. REV. 165, 167 n. 12 (1981). The distinction between a
societal wrong and an individual wrong is arguably one of the largest single elements distinguishing a crime from
a tort. See R. KNUDTEN, CRIME IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY 54 (1970).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 226-36.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 205-21.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 150-71.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 172-89.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 222-25.
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"You called me some pretty good ones," I said with a grin....
"Really, I didn't know .... "
"I know. You don't have to explain."
"I'm so grateful to you, you've saved my life. I really feel like I've just woke
up from some incredible nightmare. Do you forgive me?"
"Of course I do. Don't worry about it. You were a different person saying
those things."
"I'll never forget what you've done for me," she said, and came up to me and
kissed me.
248
This expression of gratitude is an implied consent to the actions that produce
the result. The consent may be even more obvious, as when the former cult
member might say, "I'm glad that you took whatever measures necessary to
remove me from the cult." The moment of snapping may be the start of
conduct that reasonably can be interpreted as consent. The attitude of the
subject at the time of snapping often provides a strong indication of consent to
all conduct involved. This in itself is a reason for allowing the consent to
relate back; however, the application of capacity doctrines, as below, pro-
vides another justification for doing so.
After the abduction, but before snapping, the individual usually exhibits
strong signs that he does not consent to the process. 249 However, the cult
member may not have the capacity to consent during this period if his thought
patterns have been altered by the cult to the point that he is unable to think
rationally. 250 Legal commentators have recognized that the cult conditioning
process reduces or eliminates an individual's capacity to consent. 25 1 In terms
of the common-law precedents discussed above, the cult member is as in-
capacitated to consent as if he had consumed sixteen beers 22 or was emotion-
ally distressed due to drug influence. 3 Given this lack of capacity to consent
at the outset of deprogramming, the moment of snapping becomes crucial. If
at the moment the individual regains the ability to think for himself, he ex-
presses consent, it makes sense to regard that consent as the individual's true
attitude toward the entire episode. In other words, at the moment capacity to
consent is regained, consent is given. In this light, it seems appropriate to
allow the consent to relate back to the beginning of the incident. This is what
the majority in Peterson had in mind when it stated, "As such, the question of
Susan's consent becomes a function of time." 254
248. PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 79.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 205-21.
251. Delgado, supra note 214, at 54-55. See also Note, People v. Religious Cults, I I SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1025, 1047 (1977) (cult members suffering from coercively induced mental disability cannot freely consent to
removal from the cult).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
254. 299 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1980). At least one commentator has made the argument that depro-
grammers' methods amount to a kind of reverse mind control. If this is true, the methods would tend to
invalidate the subject's consent. See generally LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46
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To determine whether this analysis is appropriate, the trier of fact would
need to determine whether the plaintiff had been a victim of mind control to
the extent that capacity to consent was impaired. One legal commentator has
suggested eight factors that would serve as evidence of mind control for legal
purposes:
(1) A sudden, drastic alteration of the individual's value hierarchy, with
an abandonment of previously-held goals;
(2) Reduction of cognitive flexibility and adaptability;
(3) Lack of emotion;
(4) Regression of behavior to childlike levels, including dependence on
cult leaders for even the most simple decision making;
(5) Physical changes, especially weight loss;
(6) Pathological symptoms such as dissociation and delusions;
(7) Involvement of a cult that has a history of using mind control; and
(8) Presence of dietary and sleep deprivation. 255
This inquiry could be accomplished by lay testimony without the expert
medical testimony of psychiatrists or psychologists.5 6
One further factor may affect the analysis. In most litigation involving
tort liability in deprogramming contexts, the cult member has returned to the
cult and has brought suit. This usually occurs as a result of the phenomenon
known as floating;2 7 that is, although the cult member has snapped out of the
cult mentality, at some later point his past conditioning causes him to float
back into the previous controlled way of thinking, or rather, of not thinking.
At this point, after the family wrongly concludes that recovery is complete
and removes all restraints, the cult member often returns to the cult and
brings suit. In terms of the analysis, this does not present a problem, if the
defendants can demonstrate that the individual snapped and consented at some
point.
A related problem occurs when the cult member who returns to the cult
after deprogramming claims that he never really snapped, but that he pretend-
ed to do so and cooperated with his captors to create an opportunity for
escape. This argument has been advanced in several cases. 258 If the words and
actions of the plaintiff could reasonably be viewed as an expression of consent,
those words and actions operate as an apparent consent. 259 An exception to the
FORDHAM L. REV. 599 (1978). This argument ignores the crucial distinction between the deprogramming
process and cultic mind control. The cult indoctrination process uses various techniques to impair or eliminate
the subject's ability to think independently. See supra text accompanying notes 205-21. The deprogramming
process, however, encourages and enables the subject to think clearly and rationally, without attempting to
impose any predetermined doctrine or world view. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55, 222-25.
255. Delgado, supra note 214, at 70-71.
256. Id. at 71.
257. See supra text accompanying note 58.
258. See, e.g., Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), affd mem., 588 F.2d 818 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
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model exists when a cult member manages to escape without ever manifesting
any consent at all.26° In all other deprogramming situations, consent operates as
a complete defense to tort liability.
26
'
V. CONCLUSION
The cult phenomenon burst onto the American scene in the 1970s.
Thousands of young people joined the Moonies, The Way, and the Hare
Krishna. Parents, concerned over the mental health of their children, turned
to professional deprogrammers for help. Together, the parents and depro-
grammers abducted cult members and attempted to free their minds from cult
domination. Deprogrammers were prosecuted for kidnapping, and many sub-
jects of unsuccessful deprogrammings recovered under federal civil rights
laws.
Peterson v. Sorlien 262 was the first case to discuss tort liability for depro-
gramming attempts. The plaintiff's parents had attempted to deprogram her
from the influence of The Way. The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a
jury verdict for the defendant parents and deprogrammers, applying plaintiff's
delayed consent retroactively to cover the entire deprogramming episode.
The elements of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are present in many deprogramming attempts.
Consent operates as a defense to all these torts, but only when there is
capacity to consent. The techniques of mind control used by the cults impair
the individual's capacity to consent, and the sudden release of the cult mem-
ber from that mind control is the goal of deprogramming. If at the moment the
individual regains the capacity to think for himself he expresses consent, that
consent reveals his true attitude toward the entire episode and should be
applied retroactively.
The Peterson decision makes good common sense and should be follow-
ed in all future tort litigation involving deprogramming attempts.
Douglas H. Cook
260. While infrequent, this does happen. See PATRICK & DULACK, supra note 40, at 164-66. In such a
case consent is eliminated as a possible defense, and tort liability presumably would lie.
261. Following the court's decision in Peterson, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court. The Court denied certiorari on March 30, 1981. 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). The essence
of plaintiff's petition was that by allowing consent to operate as a complete defense, the State of Minnesota had
abrogated plaintiffs cause of action against her parents and the deprogrammers, thereby constituting state
action in violation of plaintiff's first amendment right to freedom of religion. Petition for writ of certiorari at i,
8-9. For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved in deprogramming, see Delgado, supra note 214, at
25-49.
262. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).

